On the basis of extensive discussions with the Pakistanis spread over two months in New Delhi, Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar it would appear that a way out of the Indo-Pakistan impasse may be found if the two governments agree to end the present ambiguity on the question of nuclear weapons, acknowledge that they already possess such weapons, or can assemble them fairly quickly, and open discussions on that basis.
Such a move is obviously inconceivably in the absence of a nod from Washington. Both New Delhi and Islamabad are scared of reprisals by the West, especially the United States and Japan in the shape of suspension of aid. But it is about time that Washington recognises that there is no realistic substitute if India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programmes are to be brought into the open and to be effectively capped.
Converging Interests
Candid discussions on the nuclear issue can transform the atmosphere between the two countries as nothing else. Indeed, it does not appear likely that they can either agree to lower trade barriers significantly or move towards a mutually acceptable solution of the Kashmir dispute in the absence of a major agreement. This is possible only on an issue on which their interests converge.
Both India and Pakistan are under pressure to contain and gradually reduce their defence expenditure. Neither can avoid some move in that direction. But that by itself will not help improve their relations unless the cuts follow mutual discussions and agreements. That, on the face of it, is out of the question in the present climate.
Indian and Pakistani perceptions diverge violently. For Indians, the central issue is Pakistan’s ill-disguised support to terrorists in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and for Pakistanis, it is Kashmir. The more moderate among them are willing to set aside these issues for the time being and explore other avenues such as a non-aggression pact, friendship treaty and freer trade in order to produce an atmosphere in which it may be possible to grapple with the above problems.
This approach is worthy of exploration. But its limitations should be evident. The critical issue of nuclear weapons has to be confronted and tackled. The present US approach is hopelessly inadequate.
So far India has had to bear the onus of non-adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. The truth is that Islamabad is as anxious and determined to retain its nuclear option as New Delhi. Indeed, it would be a safe conclusion that it has made the proposals it has from time to time in the knowledge that India would reject them in view of its concern for its long-term security vis-a-vis China. Islamabad would face a crisis of unknown magnitude if by some chance New Delhi was to agree to accept its latest proposal or some modified version of it.
While it is open to question whether the Narasimha Rao government can survive an agreement to open discussions with Pakistan on the nuclear weapons issue so long as friendly relations with Beijing are not assured, it is obvious that the Nawaz Sharif government cannot. At the very start the Pakistan Prime Minister will need to seek access to, and control over, the nuclear weapons programme which has all along been the exclusive preserve of the army. It is wholly unlikely that the army command will agree to such a dramatic change in the correlation of forces within Pakistan.
The democratic experiment in Pakistan is at a nascent stage; only six months ago, the duly-elected Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, was arbitrarily dismissed; Mr Nawaz Sharif’s hold on power is insecure; President Ishaq Khan continues to play his own games and Ms Benazir Bhutto might well be provoked into boycotting the National Assembly and taking politics back to the street. It is, therefore, necessary to avoid a confrontation between the Prime Minister and the army command on the sensitive question of control over the nuclear weapons programme.
This argument might not have been conclusive if General Aslam Beg, army chief of staff till as recently as last August, had not launched an intensely anti-US and anti-India campaign and thereby made it difficult for the army command to offer any kind of accommodation to Washington and Mr Nawaz Sharif on the nuclear weapons issue. But General Beg has launched such a campaign and queered the pitch for his successor, General Asif Nawaz Janjua.
Strategic Defiance
It is easy enough to fault General Beg’s concept of “strategic defiance” of the United States and to establish that Beijing cannot possibly replace Moscow as a rival power centre in collaboration with Islamabad and Teheran. Similarly, it is possible to point out that the General has not yet been able to mobilise much support for his point of view. But to engage in this kind of exercise is to miss the importance of the challenge he represents.
The US-Pakistan alliance has been a “marriage of convenience” from the very start. It has not been based on shared values. On the contrary, anti-Americanism has simmered just below the surface in Pakistan. It burst into the open in 1979 when mobs set fire to the American embassy in Islamabad. General Aslam Beg is seeking to keep alive this potentially explosive sentiment and he has put himself in a position where he can hope to capitalise on it.
As it happens, circumstances are propitious for the General. Since President Bush has not been able to certify since 1990 that Pakistan does not possess and is not trying to acquire nuclear weapons as required under the Pressler amendment, US military-cum-economic assistance has remained suspended for over a year. The military is naturally resentful of this action on the part of Washington and is beginning to look towards Moscow as a source for military supplies in addition to Beijing.
This cannot but reduce US influence in official Islamabad and fuel the anti-American sentiment among volatile sections of the community under the influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The Jamaat, it may be recalled, was strongly pro-Saddam Hussein at the time of the Gulf war last January and so was public opinion in Pakistan. This was not an aberration. The pro-Saddam sentiment was an expression of anti-Americanism which has survived Iraq’s ignominious defeat.
Politicised Army
It is commonplace that the Pakistan army is highly politicised since it has ruled over the country for 25 years. Indeed, a number of Pakistanis believe, rightly or wrongly, that General Aslam Beg was planning a coup last summer and that he would have got away with it if some generals had not refused to go along with him.
The proposition does not, on the face of it, appear credible. But that cannot detract from the basic proposition that the army remains the strongest factor in Pakistan’s power play.
There is another aspect of the problem which deserves even greater attention. The army has been radicalised by virtue of being Islamicised. The process was on long before General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in 1977. Unlike in the pre-independence era, many young officers had begun to come from lower middle class families susceptible to the influence of ulema and the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami. Zia pushed this process further. By aligning himself to the Jamaat, he made it possible for army officers and men to openly subscribe to its ideology.
If anti-Americanism has indeed become part of the political culture of the Pakistan army in view of its radicalisation and suspension of US aid, it is necessary to take it into account in dealing with Islamabad. To cut a long and complicated story short, it is as necessary to avoid provocation to it as to contain it. The present US policy serves neither purpose. Washington is, of course, not without influence in Islamabad. In theory, Pakistan’s need for aid from the World Bank and the IMF gives the US considerable leverage there. In reality, this is not a leverage Washington can use effectively to promote Indo-Pakistan understanding and to roll back Pakistan’s nuclear programme. China’s willingness to provide a 300-MW nuclear reactor to Islamabad should help clinch the issue.
The Times of India, 2 January 1992