Behind the screen of much talked about “structural” changes in the economy may be taking place an equally significant transformation of the country’s political life. Unlike the former, the latter is neither being “imposed” on us by an external agency, nor is it being engineered by a group of Indians conscious of its need. Indeed, it can be said to be autonomous of any agency, Indian or foreign. That is perhaps one reason why it has failed to draw attention to itself.
It is, however, necessary to sound a note of caution. It is still by no means assured that the change would get consolidated on a long-term basis. It may well prove short-lived, as such developments often do. Even so, movement in a certain direction is clearly discernible.
Ideology
The change in the making has little to do with ideology, imported or indigenous. Nor is it in any way related to the so-called “realignment of political forces”. It is something much more basic. It is the product of what the famous French historian, Bernard Braudel, alls longue duree, that of developments and movements spanning centuries.
In sum, we may be witnessing a shift of the centre of political power from the north to the south of the Vindhyas with consequences that can only be called breath-taking. Though it is generally not recognised or remembered, such a shift has taken place in the past, as in the wake of the decline of the Mauryas in the second century BC when the Satvahans emerged as the dominant power, or after the death of emperor Harsha in the middle of the seventh century AD when the Rashtrakutas came to see themselves in the Chakravartin (universal ruler) role, rightly in view of their capacity to intervene in power struggles in the north. This may be taking place once again.
The choice of the Vindhyas as the dividing line calls for an explanation. The natural one is obvious enough. The Vindhya mountain ranges divide India as no other geographical feature does; the so-called Aryan-Dravidian one is a fabrication; in effective cultural terms it can be dismissed as being of no account. But geography is not the only reason for the choice in the present context. Two other considerations figure in the calculation.
First, foreign conquests did not uproot the people in the region below the Vindhyas to the same extent as they did those in the north. That is why we have not, for instance, witnessed in the former region the rise either of a highly Persianised and Arabised language, as in the case of Urdu in north India, or of a Westernized elite comparable to the one in Bengal. The Maharashtrian and the south Indian Brahmin took to western education with the same alacrity as his Bengali counterpart. But he remained more rooted in his tradition partly because the impact of Muslim conquest and rule had fallen less heavily on him and, therefore, not undermined his capacity for resistance to the same extent. It follows that the people south of the Vindhyas are much better placed to be engaged in self-affirmation without shrieking about it.
Secondly, bitter disputes of the past continue to plague the north and undermine its creative abilities. The Hindu-Muslim problem, for instance, has not gone away despite so drastic an attempt at solution as partition in 1947. Indeed, it can be argued that for centuries the north’s claim to preeminence has rested on its role as a shock absorber against foreign invasions and that the centre of Indian culture has effectively been located below the Vindhyas.
The latter is, of course, not altogether a development of our millennium which opened with Mahmud Ghaznavi’s raids, though the reality of the south being a repository of Indian culture has been obscured by pernicious racist theories. Bhakti, which has sustained Indian culture for a whole millennium, for instance, originated in the South. It can be traced back not just to the Alavar saints in the sixth century, as is the general practice, but to the Varuna Vasistha samvad (dialogue) in the Atharva Veda which Jain tradition places between 3,000 and 2,500 BC. Of the six Vedangas (regarded as part of the Vedas), three essential for the preservation of our culture and civilisation – Dharma Kalpa Sutra relating to ritual in both the public domain and the family sphere, Mimamsa Nyaya (philosophy), and Bharatnatya Natya Shastra – are of southern provenance.
Protective Role
As for the north, its protective role is by no means over. India continues to face grave danger to its security. But the more pertinent point is that even the external danger has not helped us avoid the path of self-stultification. The terrorist menace in Kashmir may be regarded as an offshoot of partition. But what is one to say of terrorism in Punjab and Assam and of the intensification of caste conflicts in Bihar? The point is not to apportion blame but to note the result. The north has tied itself in knots and is unlikely to be able to untie them for quite some time.
The process goes back to 1967 when the Indian National Congress lost power in all north Indian states. North India has since lacked a political instrument capable of translating numbers into power. Indira Gandhi used every means, fair or foul, to restore the Congress to office in north Indian states. While she succeeded on a surface view, she could not possibly have invested north India with an worthwhile measure of coherence. So her success had to be transient. Equally pertinently, the “success” of her opponents had to be transient. She lost in 1977 and they in 1980.
This inability of north India either to restore the Congress to its earlier status or to replace it was covered from public view by the results of the poll within weeks of the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. North Indians then felt threatened and, therefore, rallied behind Rajiv Gandhi. But the deceptive cover was off at the next general election in 1989.
Triangular Struggle
If the 1989 poll was inconclusive, the break-up of the Janata Dal-BJP understanding and the inability of either organisation to emerge as the spokesman of north India in the 1991 elections has settled the issue for quite some time. On the face of it, the BJP is better placed than the Janata Dal. But the struggle is triangular since the Congress is down but not out. And so it is likely to remain as far into the future as we can see.
This is the negative part of the assessment and it is fairly conclusive. The positive part is admittedly not so conclusive but it is pretty strong. Two points may be made in this connection.
First, industrialisation is far more advanced in the region below the Vindhyas than above them. The new economic policy can only increase the advantage coastal areas naturally enjoy in trade-linked economic development.
Secondly, the south stood by the Congress in 1977, 1989 and 1991 when it suffered humiliating defeats in the north. The split in the Telugu Desam in Andhra and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, on the one hand, and the decline of the Janata Dal in Karnataka and Gujarat, on the other, can help forge it into an effective instrument of the people below the Vindhyas.
Mr. PV Narasimha Rao symbolises the change. Despite his being a respected and senior Congress leader, it is doubtful that he could have smoothly moved into the office first of party president and then of Prime Minister on the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi if the character of the Congress Parliamentary Party had not already been transformed. Certainly, he could not have consolidated his position so quickly and smoothly.
Mr. Morarji Desai was, of course, the first Prime Minister from outside the Hindi belt. But the Janata Party was overwhelmingly a north Indian enterprise. That was why Charan Singh could bring him down. No leader from north of the Vindhyas can challenge Mr. Rao in the present power configuration or even hope to succeed him.
The Times of India, 26 March 1992