Iranian leaders must be smiling over the establishment of a ‘no-fly zone’ by the US, Britain and France over southern Iraq. Whatever the outcome of this, Iran cannot but benefit. There are two possibilities.
First, this ‘first step’ will be followed by others for sustaining a rebellion in southern Iraq – if it is on – and promote it, if it is not. Second, this will be called off – in effect, if not in name – once the presidential poll is over. Under the first option, the West will have unleashed powerful forces of disorder in the entire Arab world already reeling under the onslaught of fundamentalists. And if they take the second, they will have proved themselves to be undependable. Either way, Iran will benefit.
From the Iranian point of view, the first ‘solution’ is preferable. It will finally break up and impoverish Iraq by denying it access to sea and oil and make it and other Arab countries in the Gulf vulnerable to Iranian pressure. It will also help furnish the Arab fundamentalists-trained guerillas they need in their war against established regimes.
The chances of that happening are good. It is unbelievable but true that an Afghanistan-type solution has been recommended by influential commentators in Washington, possibly on a cue from the CIA, or the Pentagon, or the White House, and indeed from all three.
Even otherwise, the ‘no-fly zone’ decision has a logic of its own. That logic points in the direction of another Afghanistan. But this logic is not irreversible. It can be reversed when the presidential election in the US is over, provided, as is likely, Saddam Hussein does not get provoked. It may not be reversed if President Bush is re-elected. Thus, the Bush administration has made itself a prisoner of Saddam Hussein by being obsessed with him.
Its hopes of a successful anti-Saddam revolt in Baghdad has not materialised and it is not likely to materialise with the help of opposition leaders who have for years lived in exile and lack both unity and significant following at home.
Washington can find some pretext for bombing Baghdad. But while that cannot guarantee the demise or overthrow of Saddam Hussein, it can ensure a widespread revulsion against the US, especially in the Arab world. That is one reason why the so-called Afghanistan solution has come to be recommended. 1″
But the remedy could be worse than the disease. Arabs trained by Afghan Mujahideen are active in Sudan, Algeria, Egypt and, on some accounts, in Saudi Arabia as well. The rise of a guerilla force in Southern Iraq will reinforce the ‘Afghan factor’ in West Asia many times over.
If Washington was sensitive to this threat, it would have shown some willingness, however indirectly, to live with Saddam Hussein. Instead, it has moved in the opposite direction. In the absence of credible and verified evidence, it is difficult to accept, at its face value, the US charge of Saddam Hussein bombing Shias in the marshes in Southern Iraq.
But even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that there is merit in the charge, it cannot justify the present move, from the West’s own point of view. Americans are known for their contempt for international law when it does not suit them. In this specific case, they have disregarded the UN Security Council and wilfully misinterpreted its resolution 688.
In view of US influence and power, however, it is pointless to invoke morality and legality. But US power cannot possibly neutralise the consequences of the partition of Iraq, de facto or de jure, for the power balance in the Gulf and the future of Arab countries in the region and beyond. These fears can turn out be misplaced. It is possible that Saddam Hussein will be overthrown as a result of a palace coup. But on the face of it that appears unlikely. He has defied Western calculations in the past and he may do so again.
A change of the occupant in the White House is also on the cards. But that is too far away. Two months is a long time in the affairs of the Gulf.
Economic Times, 4 September 1992