It is difficult to disagree with the Prime Minister on some of the points he has made in his reply to a discussion on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the Lok Sabha last Wednesday. It just cannot be denied that Mrs. Gandhi was guided at least partly by political considerations when she gave the go ahead signal for the Pokharan test in May 1974 and that the explosion led to the withdrawal of co-operation by Canada and intensification of the pressure by the United States on this country for signing the non-proliferation treaty. Indeed, Mr. Desai would have been within his rights if he had added that the top scientific establishment had either grossly under-estimated India’s continuing dependence on imports in respect of its nuclear programme, or Mrs. Gandhi had ignored their advice and that she had in all probability neither examined the possible consequences of her action nor firmly decided to pursue it to its logical conclusion. The Prime Minister is also quite justified in pointing out that all nuclear programmes, including the one to produce electricity, involve serious hazards, that a decision on a nuclear blast even for a specific purpose like mining or oil exploration has to be and will be taken at the highest political level and not by scientists, that his decision in this regard cannot bind future governments, that he has inherited the agreement with the United States whereby India is debarred from reprocessing the nuclear waste which the Tarapur plant produces and that he is not to blame for the delay in the production of heavy water.
But it will, on the face of it, be rather surprising if it is indeed true, as Mr. Desai has said, that Indian scientists have learnt nothing valuable from the Pokharan test or that they could be or can be in a position to organize a highly controlled nuclear blast for a specific purpose like mining or oil exploration without first gaining sufficient experience in organizing underground tests like the one at Pokharan. In that case, it will be difficult to find a rational explanation for the tests which the Soviet Union continues to conduct with similar ends in view. Thus, it may not be unfair to infer that despite the apparent concession to his critics within the Janata party and outside, the Prime Minister in fact remains firm in his opposition to all nuclear blasts and that he does not intend to allow any for any purpose whatsoever. But whether this is the case or not, the fact must be faced that he is having to cope with an extremely ticklish situation. In this connection, he perhaps overstates his case when he contends that he has not been under pressure by the two super-powers to commit himself not to allow any nuclear test. But the distinction he makes between pressure to this effect and pressure to sign the non-proliferation treaty is not only a valid one but a basic one, though he cannot elucidate the distinction for obvious reasons. While the treaty is clearly intended to ensure that the signatory country, with the exception of the big five, is never in a position to hold nuclear tests, a decision to forgo tests does not prevent a country from acquiring the necessary capability.